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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ARNOLD FRANCOM, dba DAY,
NITE LAUNDERCENTER NO. 8,
and
GLEN PALMER, dba DAY,NITE
LAUNDERCENTER NO. 6,
Appellants,

Case No.

9271

vs.

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

By statutory amendment, effective July 1, 1959, the
Utah sales tax was extended to and is now imposed upon
"the amount paid or charged for laundry and dry cleaning
services." Utah Code Annotated Section 59,15 (g) 1953.
Taypayers contend that they are not subject to taxation
under the Act, as amended, and state that the sole issue
before this court is whether or not they "render" laundry
services. The Tax Commission submits that such a state,
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ment of the question tends to unduly restrict the scope
of the statute and that the issue more accurately stated is
whether or not amounts received from coin operated wash ..
ers and dryers in a laundercenter constitute amounts paid
or charged for laundry and dry cleaning services..

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Tax Commission agrees substantially with the
statement of facts as set forth by appellants.

STATE.MENT OF POINTS
1. AMOUNTS RECEIVED FROM COIN OPER..
ATED WASHERS AND DRYERS IN A LAUNDER
CENTER CONSTITUTE AMOUNTS PAID OR
CHARGED FOR LAUNDRY AND DRY CLEANING
SERVICES WITHIN THE MEANING OF 59--15--4(g),
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED.
II. THE DENOMINATION OF A PORTION OF
TAXPAYERS' ACTIVITIES AS A RENTAL OF
EQUIPMENT WILL NOT SERVE TO AVOID THE
SERVICES TAX.
III. THE UTAH LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO
EXTEND THE SERVICES TAX TO AMOUNTS PAID
OR CHARGED FOR THE USE OF COIN OPER.ATED WASHERS AND DRYERS.
IV. THE RULE OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION
OF TAXING STi\TUES IS NOT APPLICABLE IN
THIS CASE.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AMOUNTS RECEIVED FROM COIN OPERATED
WASHERS AND DRYERS IN A LAUNDER CENTER
CONSTITUTE AMOUNTS PAID OR CHARGED FOR
LAUNDRY AND DRY CLEANING SERVICES WITH,
IN THE MEANING OF 59,15,4(g), UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED.
To adopt taxpayers' contention as to the meaning of
the term "laundry services" would unduly restrict its mean,
ing and thus circumvent the intention of the legislature.
In attempting to define the noun "services" from the verb
"services" error is committed. Taxpayers seek to impose
the requirement of personal action as a requisite necessary
to constitute service. It is submitted that such a require,
ment improperly limits the meaning of laundry services.
"Services", as such, has a variety of meanings, de,
pendent upon the context or sense in which it is used.
In some instances it has been used to include a sale, as a
sale of food by a restaurant. "The verb 'service' means to
perform services of maintenance, supply, repair, installa,
tion, distribution, etc., for or upon. The noun 'service'
means supply of needs; use; also formerly, utility, act or
means of supplying some general demand . . . " Central
Power & Light Co. v. State, Tex. Civ. App., 165 S.W. 2nd
920. See also Webster's New International Dictionary
( 1938); Addison Miller, Inc. v. Comm. of Taxation, 249
Minn. 24, 81 l\T.W. 2nd 89. This dictionary in defining
\vhat is meant by service includes also the following which
are deemed pertinent:
"19. Act or means of supplying some general
demand."
~

~

~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
"20. Anything supplied for, accommodation.
Work esp. of supply and repair, done to meet the
needs of customers; as 24..-hour service.
~

~

~

"22. Usually in pl. any result of useful labor
which does not produce a tangible commodity. In
economics, such business concerns as railroads, tele..phone companies, and laundries, and such persons
as physicians, are regarded as performing services."
The same dictionary defines "laundry" as:
"2. An establishment or place where laundry is
done.''
"Launder" is defined as:
"To wash, as clothes; to wash and smooth with
a flat iron or mangle.''
Appellants devote three pages of their brief to at-tempting to convert the court to their view as to what the
"approved usage of the language" is in regard to laundry
services. It is obvious that the definition of this phrase
must not be derived from other decisions contruing the
word "services" in an entirely different context. The
plain meaning of the term "laundry services" as used by
the legislature was intended to include such laundry service
as is offered by the appellants.

POINT II.
THE DENOMIN..t\TION OF A PORTION OF TAX-PAYERS' ACTIVITIES AS A RENTAL OF EQUIP..
MENT WILL NOT SERVE TO AVOID THE SERV-ICES TAX.
Even if it found that the plain meaning of the term
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"laundry service" is "acts of laundering" as contended by
taxpayers, a more far reaching issue presented by this
appeal is whether appellants may avoid what normally
would constitute a taxable transaction by mechanization
or elimination of the human element from a service tran . .
sanction and denomina~~jthe same a rental of equipment.
.\

.....

_,..,...,

The subject matter of this appeal is denominated by
appellants themselves as a "laundercenter." Interpreted,
this means a place where laundering or washing is done.
The sole business of the owner of such a laundercenter
is to sell the fruits of his business to the public. Appellants
are in the laundry business. They do not sell machines.
They make them available to the public for a period of
approximately one..-half hour for washers and five min..utes for dryers, and in return an exchange or consideration
passes from the customer to the owner. The totality of the
facilities provided for the customer is such that it con. .
stitutes more than a mere rental of washing and drying
machines. In fact, for the consideration that changes hands
the customer receives far more than the mere naked
right of possession of a fixed washing or drying machine.
He receives the complete facilities of a laundercenter, which
include soap and bleach dispensers, chairs, washers, dryers,
refreshments, coin changers, folding tables and carts. Ap. .
pellants are providing service consisting of a comfortable,
convenient, relatively inexpensive place where laundry is
done at a discount over prevailing prices. In making such
a facility available on a competitive basis, appellants pro . .
vide laundry services.
However, it is immaterial whether or not the services
provided by appellants constitute a rental of machinery,
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because where the legislature has imposed a tax upon a
transaction which is broad enough by definition to cover
the activity of appellant, the result is simply a matter
of statutory interpretation as to whether or not the activi..
ties of appellants fall within those contemplated by the
legislature. It is significant that the Utah Legislature has,
by the enactment of 59~15~2(g) extended the sales tax law
in exactly this manner to rental transactions:
"When right to continuous possession or use
of any article of tangible personal property is grant..
ed under a lease or contract and such transfer of
possession would be taxable if an outright sale were
made, such lease or contract shall be considered
the sale of such article and the tax shall be com..
puted and paid by the vendor or lessor upon the
rentals paid."
It is submitted that the presence or absence of the hu..
man or personal element in a service transaction should
not be determinative as to whether or not here is a taxable
service performed. It is also submitted that the tax in
question is a transaction tax upon services and that if it is
found that appellants do perform laundry services, it
matters not vvhether the technical requisites of a sale are
met.
In the case of A1nerican 1-Jocker Co. v. City of Neu·
York, 308 N. Y. 264, 125 N.E. 2d 421, the question was
presented as "'hether or not the O\Yner of coin controlled
lockers in which the public checked its baggage and other
personal belongings for a period time not in excess of 24
hours was subject to taxation under a sales tax \Yhich im.
posed a tax upon transactions which inYolved the passage
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of title. In ruling in the negative the court indulged in the
following important dictum:
"The only real distinction between the two
methods of rental service is the semi. . automatic na. .
ture of plaintiff's service, which is ordinarily ren. .
dered by means of the patron himself checking
his baggage and removing it from storage, rather
than having an employee attend to it as in the case
of the handchecking service. The fact that plaintiff
through its method of operation has eliminated the
necessity of employees attending to the immediate
wants of one who wishes to check his baggage is
not any ground of distinction for purposes of tax. .
ation."
Taxpayers, by reference to "self service" and their ap . .
peal to the yellow pages of the Salt Lake City Telephone
Directory have attempted to draw attention from the real
nature of their business. The Tax Commission recognizes
that the said directory is not generally regarded as com. .
petent legal authority, but it is suggested that the distinction
set forth in that directory is merely one of convenience for
the reader so that he might determine whether or not
the laundry is one in which he can defray the cost of per. .
forming part of the labor himself, or one in which the labor
is done entirely by the laundry. The Tax Commission con . .
tends that the only real distinction between the two
methods of rendering service in this case is the semi. .
automatic nature of appellants' service. It is submitted that
the fact that appellants through their method of operation
have eliminated the necessity of employees attending to the
immediate wants of one who wishes to wash his clothes
is not any grounds of distinction for purposes of taxation.
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It is the optnton of the Commission that the presence
or absence of the human element in a sales transaction
should not be determinative as to whether or not there
is a taxable service performed.

POINT III.
THE UTAH LEGISL.LA.TURE INTENDED TO EX..
TEND THE SERVICES TAX TO AMOUNTS PAID
OR CHARGED FOR THE USE OF COIN OPERATED
WASHERS AND DRYERS.
Taxpayers contend that due to practical problems of
collection the legislature could not have intended to extend
the services tax in its operation. We need not accept the
alleged fact that the cost of altering appellants' rna..
chinery would be prohibitive. No such fact is before
us, as the practical problems in collection as set out in
some detail by the taxpayers have not been stipulated to
by respondent and hence are not before the court. How..
ever, assuming that practical difficulties do exist, that
issue has been before this court at least twice before in
W. F. Jensen Candy Co. v. State Tax Commission, 90 Ut.
359, 61 P. 2nd 629 (1936) and in State Tax Commission
v. City Commission of Logan, 88 Utah 406, 54 P. 2d 1197
( 19 35), and the court held in both cases that this "'as a
practical and not a legal problem and that the legislature
and the court lea\'e the problems of collection to the
vendor. The court in the Jensen case found a legislative
intent to tax sales of less than 50 cents even though the
practical problems involved therein were greater than al.legedly exist in the present case. The court in that case
said: ". . . The vendor has the obligation to collect the
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tax from the vendee; that is, he may 'if he sees fit' do so
... or he may if he sees fit elect to pay or absorb the tax
himself.''
A statute is not open to construction as a matter of
course. It is open to construction only where it is found
that the language used in the statute will bear two or more
constructions. However, in interpreting such a statute,
the court will not place a construction thereupon which
will frustrate the intention of the legislature or place the
constitutionality of the statute in doubt. Dunn v. Bryan,
77 Ut. 604, 299 Pac. 253 (1931), State Water Pollution
Control Board v. Salt Lake City, 6 Ut. 2d 247, 311 P. 2d
370 (1957), Howe v. State Tax Commission, ______ Utah
______________________________________ , (June, 1960). Assuming without
conceding that the statute involved herein is properly sub . .
ject to more than one interpretation, that construction
urged by taxpayers would render the statute unconstitu . .
tional and cannot, therefore, be said to be within the pur. .
view of legislative intention. In a regular laundry, both
mechanical and personal service are intermingled. Charges
made for such laundry service are subject to taxation with . .
out differentiation as to which portion of the charge is
representative of work performed mechanically and which
portion is representative of work or service performed by
human beings. In a self. .service laundry the customer ob . .
tains a price discount by performing certain personal
services for himself. He performs no mechanical service
and only receives a discount for putting clothes in the
washer for him. To say that charges made by this type of
laundry are not taxable, whereas charges made by a regular
laundry are taxable, is to place an interpretation upon
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this statute not contemplated by the legislature such as to
constitute an unconstitutional discrimination against regu. .
lar laundries.

POINT IV.
THE RULE OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF
TAXING STATUTES IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS
CASE.
A. There is no real ambiguity regarding the intention
of the legislature. It is contended by the taxpayer in the
present case that tax statues are to be liberally construed in
favor of the taxpayer. This is a correct statement of the
general rule.
As such, this rule was adopted in Utah in 1918 and
has been reiterated many times since that date. However,
it is imposed only in case there is doubt as to the intention
of the legislature or as to the authority of the Commission
to impose taxes. See Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98
Ut. 170, Moss v. Board of Commissioners, 4 Ut. 2d 60.
In the present case, there is absolutely no doubt as to the
authority to levy the taxes in question or as to the inten..
tion of the legislature regarding the taxability of laundry
services. In other words, the rule that the taxpayers have
invoked in their argument in the present case is not entirely
applicable to the solution thereof. This is in accordance
with a notable authority on taxation, e.g., Cooley, Taxa..
tion, Volume II, Section 505, pg. 1125, wherein it is stated:
"\Vithout regard as to whether tax statutes
should receive a strict or liberal construction, it is
elementary that they should receive a fair construe.-
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tion, to effect the end for which they were intended.
This does not mean such a construction as to defeat
the intention of the legislature. Where there is really
no ambiguity, the rule that the ambiguity must be
resolved in favor of the taxpayer does not of course
apply."
B. The rule of strict construction may not serve to
defeat the intention of the legislature where it is un..
necessary.
The rule as set forth by the taxpayers contains a notable
omission. It is provided in 47 Am. Jur., Sales and Use
Taxes, Sec. 14:
". . . (T) he general rule that tax statutes will
be strictly construed and that doubts and amibuities
will be resolved in favor of the taxpayer and against
the taxing power is applicable, although the rule of
strict construction may not serve to defeat the in ..
tention of the legislature where this is unnecessary."
(Emphasis supplied)
As it has been clearly shown in Point II of this brief
that the legislature intended to tax such laundry services
as are provided by the taxpayers, they should not now be
heard to invoke the rule of strict construction in their
favor so as to defeat the legislative intent.
C. The construction given a statute by those charged
with the duty of executing it is always entitled to the
most respectful consideration and ought not to be over. .
ruled without cogent reasons. McKendrick ·v. State Tax
Commission, 9 Ut. 2d 418, 347 P. 2d 177 (1959).
The Tax Commission, as the body empowered by the
legislature to administer and execute the tax laws of the
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state of Utah has applied the services tax statute to ap~
pellants' activities. The Tax Commission has thus far re~
frained from applying the tax on rentals to appellants'
activites for the reason that these activities have been and
are considered to be laundry services within the purport of
Section 59~15~4(g), Utah Code Annotated, 1953. This is
evidenced by Tax Commission Regulation No. 78 indi~
eating that the tax on services is applied to the charge
made to customers of laundries and launderettes. The
court should properly allow considerable latitude to this
determination as made by the Tax Commission and should
not pisturb it unless it is clearly erroneous. McKendrick v.
Staf-te Tax Commission, ibid.
CONCLUSION
Appellants' activities constitute laundry services with~
in the meaning of Section 59--15--4(g), Utah Code Anno-tated, 1953, as amended, and the tax imposed thereon
should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,
Walter L. Budge,
Attorney General
Norman S. Johnson,
Assistant Attorney General
F. Burton Howard,
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys /or Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

